The Middle Corridor could stimulate investment, yet Georgia has no time to lose in developing projects
At the Poti Sea Port, on the Black Sea coast of Georgia, rows of cranes are hard at work on the quaysides loading containers on to waiting ships. Many of their cargoes have come from as far as Central Asia, or even western China. Once loaded on to ships at Poti, this freight will continue its journey westwards to Turkey or Romania, ultimately destined for customers in the EU.
Poti, Georgia’s largest commercial port, has been getting busier of late. “The volumes have been increasing over the past years, steadily,” says Christian Roeder, managing director at APM Terminals in Poti, the company that operates the port.
The need to streamline trade through the “Middle Corridor”, a loosely defined route stretching across Central Asia and the Caucasus, has become increasingly apparent since 2022. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has made many companies reluctant to transport goods through the ‘Northern Corridor’, which previously served as the main overland link between China and Europe.
Volumes on the Northern Corridor fell by half in 2023, according to an Atlantic Council report, while the Middle Corridor saw an 89 per cent increase in volumes.
Meanwhile, recurrent disruption to maritime traffic through the Red Sea as a result of attacks by Houthi militants in Yemen has highlighted the vulnerability of key sea trading routes, adding further momentum to efforts to develop the Middle Corridor.
Streamlining trade
Six hours by train from Poti, the new Tbilisi Dry Port opened its doors in June. The project, majority owned by Abu Dhabi-based AD Ports Group, is one of a handful of major infrastructure developments taking shape as Georgia seeks to position itself as a trade hub.
The facility is designed to allow cargo to be loaded to and from trains at Tbilisi, thus reducing the reliance on trucks for freight movements. Levan Berdzenishvili, commercial manager at Tbilisi Dry Port, says the new project is “game-changing”, especially for companies in neighbouring Armenia and Azerbaijan.
“Instead of, from Poti, taking containers to Yerevan by truck, it’s better to bring by railway to Tbilisi and from Tbilisi by truck,” he says, adding that the rail option is “much faster and cheaper”.
A second phase, due for completion next year, will connect additional rail spurs and warehousing facilities. The ultimate ambition is for the dry port to become an intermodal hub, solidifying Tbilisi’s status as a nodal point on the Middle Corridor.
An energy corridor
The Middle Corridor is not just a freight route. Several oil and gas pipelines already run through Georgia, carrying hydrocarbons from Azerbaijan to export terminals in Turkey.
The country is also now set to become an important link in the proposed Green Energy Corridor, a project to transmit electricity generated from renewable sources between the Caucasus region and several countries in eastern Europe. The centrepiece of the scheme is an underwater transmission line linking Georgia to Romania.
Zviad Gachechiladze, who represents Georgia on the board of the multinational Green Energy Corridor Company, estimates that it will take around 10 years to complete the project. Once complete, he says Georgia could earn export revenues from exporting its own green energy, as well as through charging transit fees for electrons transmitted from neighbouring Azerbaijan.
The corridor will also strengthen “security of supply” for Georgia, says Gachechiladze. “We will be able to receive energy from the European side in case of a crisis or deficit of energy.”
Challenges and competitors
Despite the push to increase Middle Corridor trade, the complexity of the route is inherently challenging. Cargoes heading from China along the corridor need to be loaded on to ships to cross the Caspian Sea, then loaded back on to trains or trucks in Baku to make it across the Caucasus, before being transferred to ships again at the Black Sea coast.
Demand for the Middle Corridor could be undermined by factors beyond Georgia’s control, including rail and port delays in Central Asia, or a lack of shipping capacity on the Caspian.
But the onus is on Georgia to upgrade its infrastructure to ensure it does not become a weak link in the chain. “The Middle Corridor will not work if Georgia is not part of it,” says Alkis Drakinos, regional director for the Caucasus at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. “Everybody who supports the Middle Corridor, or is interested in its success, cannot imagine the Middle Corridor working without Georgia.”
Georgia does, however, face competition from neighbouring countries. The August 2025 peace deal between Azerbaijan and Armenia includes a pledge to develop trade and infrastructure along the so-called ‘Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity’. Although this may take many years to come to fruition, it offers the long-term prospect of transporting goods through landlocked Armenia, then into Turkey and directly to the Mediterranean.
The emergence of an alternative route suggests Georgia has no time to lose if it wants to maximise the benefits of Middle Corridor trade.
Yet back at Poti, APM is frustrated at delays in approving an expansion plan that would see it invest at least $200mn in a new quay.
The government continues to prioritise a new deepwater port further north at Anaklia. This project has gone through multiple twists and turns; in 2020, the government cancelled a contract with a consortium made up of both western and Georgian investors that was set to develop the facility. Last year it selected a Chinese-Singaporean consortium as its preferred partner to take the project forward, although a final deal has yet to be signed.
The logic of a new port at Anaklia, which sits just a few kilometres from the de facto border with the breakaway region of Abkhazia and would require new rail and road connections, is not universally accepted.
“I find it difficult to understand the actual need for this port, because you could create similar capacity here in Poti for less money,” says Roeder.
And Drakinos says the EBRD will consider financing bankable Middle Corridor projects, but has so far received underwhelming levels of demand from private sector partners.
Asked if the government is doing enough to encourage investment in Middle Corridor infrastructure, Drakinos delivers a stark warning. “No, I don’t think so. I will tell you why: because if the government was doing enough, we would be receiving private sector demand for projects. We don’t currently receive that demand.”
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